than small ones to fund large research and development (R&D) projects. It may be easier to explain to the suppliers of financial capital why research and development projects have promise (overcoming agency problems and information asymmetries) when the source of the financing is within the organization. Moreover, firms with a strong pre-existing market position, including monopolists, may be more willing to pursue R&D if, by virtue of their head start, they have less fear that rivals, lacking their installed base and reputation, would be able successfully to market products that emulate their new ideas or are produced using their improved processes. After all, the more that the returns to an innovation go to the firm that first develops the idea, the greater the incentive the firm will have to engage in R&D activity.
Another influential twentieth century economist, Kenneth Arrow, emphasized a competing logic by which competition rather than monopoly promotes innovation. Arrow, a Nobel Prize-winning economist who taught at Stanford and Harvard, explained in 1962 that a monopolist might innovate less than competitive firms because a monopolist has more to lose. 8 Jonathan B. Baker
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June 2007 For a rich and thoughtful recent survey of the economic literature relating competition 9 and innovation, which paints the research with a finer brush than I use here, see Richard Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition-Innovation Debate?, in 6 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 159 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern, eds. 2006 ). Gilbert's nuanced literature review highlights, among other things, the significance of distinctions between product and process innovation, and between drastic and non-drastic innovation, that are not emphasized here.
6
A monopolist could spend a great deal of money to make a dramatic improvement -whether by lowering cost, improving quality or creating a new product -and take over the market, only to find that it does not get much additional business because it already has most of the business there is to get. If a competitor had come up with the same innovation, by contrast, it would earn more because it would expect to take away much of the business previously conducted by rival firms. This limitation on the incentive of the monopolist to innovate is often termed the "Arrow effect" or the "replacement effect" (so-called because it arises to the extent the monopolist replaces itself rather than developing new business). It will likely be strongest when the new product or process can be expected to fully displace the old (a "drastic" innovation), and when the monopolist does not fear that some other firm (perhaps an entrant) will soon implement a similar new idea. For example, the size of the expected reward to innovation also depends on factors 10 other than the competition considerations outlined below, including the size of the innovation, the size of the market, and the extent to which innovating eliminates the innovator's profit from its pre-innovation technology. For a review of the empirical evidence relating firm size with R&D intensity, see Richard J. Gilbert, Competition and Innovation, in Stud. 467, 468 n.4 (2001) . 7 on the determinants of innovation -far from it -but they do describe important aspects that are 10 particularly relevant to antitrust.
First, competition in innovation itself -that is, competition among firms seeking to develop the same new product or process -encourages innovation. When firms see themselves in a tough race to innovate first, they try harder to win. This dynamic is particularly evident in the economic literature on research and development competition in "patent races."
Second, competition among rivals producing an existing product encourages those firms to find ways to lower costs, improve quality, or develop better products. Firms engage in research and development because innovation may allow them to escape competition, and so earn greater profits. This is one way of looking at Arrow's point: a firm that faces less pre-innovation competition, and thus faces a more steeply downward sloping demand curve, has a greater legacy flow of economic profits, which it has an incentive to protect by slowing its innovative effort. In other words, a firm that faces less competition has less need to work hard to escape competition. 11 Third, firms that expect to face more product market competition after innovating have Jonathan B. Baker
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The inhibition to innovation arising from post-innovation product market competition 12 does not disappear if the potential innovator anticipates licensing its new product or production process rather than using it in production. If potential licensees expect to face product market competition when using the license, they would be expected not to compete aggressively to obtain the license and to pay less for it. Moreover, if the fear of product market competition with a dominant firm discourages potential rivals from purchasing the license, the only buyer may be the dominant firm, which may in consequence be able to drive a hard bargain with the innovator. For analysis of the complex interaction between the structure of the "market for ideas" (market for licensing innovations) and entrant incentives to innovate, highlighting conditions under which incumbent firms will engage in research more intensively than entrants, see Joshua S. 8 less incentive to invest in R&D. This is the flip side of the previous principle: if innovation would not allow a firm to escape competition, but would instead be expected to throw an innovating firm into a pool with sharks, the firm would anticipate profiting less from R&D. In consequence, the firm would have less incentive to pursue innovations in the first place. 12
The widely-accepted observation that the social returns to innovation exceed the private returns, remarked upon above, reflects that competition among producers ensures that buyers share in the social benefits of new ideas, so living standards rise. In the language of the software industry, this is a "feature" of competition, not a "bug." Contrary to what is sometimes suggested, this observation does not imply that the key to more innovation is to allow firms to appropriate more of the social benefits of their new products and production processes, as through broadening intellectual property rights or relaxing post-innovation antitrust enforcement.
Even in an industry in which innovators would expect to keep only a fraction of the benefits of Jonathan B. Baker
First mover advantages might arise, for example, if buyers come to associate the first 13 mover with the product, or if the first producer obtains cost savings from achieving greater scale or learns more rapidly.
If innovators would keep literally none of the benefits of innovation, they would have 14 no incentive to invest in new products and processes. Under such circumstances, in other words, the third economic principle would be likely to have an overwhelming influence on firm incentives to (not) invest in R&D. But the incentive to escape competition recognized in the second economic principle can be powerful so long as there is some, albeit incomplete, appropriability.
The preemption incentive can be understood as an application of the game-theoretic 15 literature on strategic entry deterrence to R&D competition. It is unlikely to be important if the 9 their new ideas to society -perhaps because rival imitation would be rapid, brands are weak, first movers gain only limited benefits relative to followers, new ideas are rapidly and widely 13 disseminated, or intellectual property protections are narrow -innovation incentives may be strong. This would occur if the incentive to escape current product market competition (the 14 second economic principle) is more powerful than the fear of post-innovation product market competition (the third principle) in the decision-making calculus of potential innovators.
The fourth principle, the preemption incentive, is an important corollary of the third principle. The preemption incentive arises because an innovating firm may be able to benefit from its investments in R&D not simply from its ability to offer buyers better or cheaper products, but also by discouraging potential rivals from innovating. While the initial innovator has the field to itself, an innovating rival would anticipate competition. By application of the third principle, the rival will have less incentive to invest in R&D than the initial innovator.
Accordingly, and fourth, a firm will have an extra incentive to innovate if in doing so it can discourage potential rivals from investing in R&D. 15 incumbent firm faces product market competition, if the incumbent cannot easily close off all plausible innovation paths for rivals, or if an incumbent firm is not likely to come up with an innovation quickly even with a head start on R&D. Gilbert, supra n. 10 (draft at 23). Some empirical studies find evidence of firm innovation consistent with a preemption motive. CO-OPETITION 237-41 (1996) .
10
The preemption incentive arises in many contexts. For example, if a monopolist can make investments that guarantee that it will quickly emulate any innovation introduced by a new entrant -perhaps by creating an extensive research and development operation along with a strong distribution network and brand reputation -those investments will discourage potential rivals from innovating in ways that compete with the monopolist without reducing the thought that the Big Three would fight back more vigorously, with stronger efforts to improve their small car products and their production processes, the outcome might have been different.
Then, as the third principle suggests, Nissan and Toyota, foreseeing stronger post-innovation competition, might not have been so eager to invest in improving their small cars.
These four economic principles help explain R&D investment and productivity growth in a wide range of industries. Economists studying the effects of competition on innovation empirically originally attacked the problem by looking for similarities across innovative industries, and for differences between more and less innovative ones. At one time, empirical economists had established a cottage industry relating market concentration in an industry (thought of as a proxy for product market competition) to research and development expenditures in the same industry (thought of as a proxy for innovation). Many found what was termed the "inverted U": innovation was greatest not in industries with a competitive market structure, but in those industries with oligopolistic market structures (a handful of firms, but more than a single producer). 20
On its face, this result tended to suggest that the markets most congenial to innovation were less than fully competitive (albeit not monopolies either). But these studies were unconvincing. The link between measured concentration and competition was weak, as was REV. 20 (Papers & Proceedings, May 1985) . A related project of empirical economists of the same era, comparing profits or prices in an industry to market concentration, also conducted through cross-industry comparisons, was equally unsuccessful.
Moreover, a weak positive relationship between R&D intensity and concentration 22 would be expected to appear simply because fewer firms can profitably "fit" in markets in which firms have high fixed costs resulting from R&D competition. JOHN SUTTON, TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET STRUCTURE: THEORY AND HISTORY 14, 474 (1999 13 the link between R&D expenditures and innovation. The most grave difficulty was in isolating the effect of competition. One industry might be particularly innovative for a number of reasons other than the extent of pre-innovation competition. Technological opportunities may be great:
scientists and engineers may see ways to improve computer chips but not ways to improve potato chips. Or firms may have greater guarantees they will be free from post-innovation competition, for example because they expect broad intellectual property protections or because their prior success gives them an advantage in keeping customers. It turned out to be virtually impossible to separate out possibilities like these from differences in the extent of competition when comparing one industry with another, so researchers could not practically exploit cross-industry comparisons to tell whether and how competition mattered. 22 Recently, several economists motivated by concerns among researchers working in the field of economic growth have made an heroic effort to address many of the problems with the earlier cross-industry studies, and in doing so appear to have resurrected the "inverted U" result. 23
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In particular, the studies cited in the previous footnote are only able to control for 24 industry effects in two-digit SIC industries, which are so broad as to be little better than no controls at all. Cf. Katz & Shelanski, supra n.1 at 22-23 (questioning implications of this line of research for merger policy). Another cross-industry study relating competition and innovation in British manufacturing by some of the same authors adopts a different strategy for controlling for industry effects: it does so indirectly, by using information on prior rates of innovation by each firm as a proxy for a range of factors that would influence that firm's incentives to invest in R&D (which presumably include industry-wide effects as well as firm-specific ones). Blundell, Griffith & Van Reenen, supra n.15. This study finds evidence that less competitive industries innovate less (consistent with the second principle) and that firms with a high market share have greater incentives to preemptively innovate (consistent with the fourth principle). The results are notable given that the study would be expected to be biased against finding any relationship, as industry concentration and firm market share are poorly measured. (Product markets are defined at broad three-digit industrial classification levels and geographic markets are presumed U.K.wide without analysis.) Another study, a cross-sectional analysis using firm-level data, finds evidence that competition (as measured by more than five rivals or lower profit margins) is associated with greater rates of total factor productivity growth for individual firms. Stephen J. Nickell, Competition and Corporate Performance, 104 J. POL. ECON. 724 (1996) . In any case, one of the authors interprets this line of research as showing that in general, for the industries studied, "a strengthening of competition policy is likely to have a positive overall effect on innovation," in contradiction to Schumpeterian theories. 25 An alternative strategy for studying the empirical relationship between competition and innovation discards the cross-industry study, and instead compares the performance of the same Jonathan B. Baker
The success of this empirical strategy in controlling for cross-industry differences, in 26 order to isolate the effect of competition on innovation, depends importantly on how well industries are defined. Still another empirical approach looks at the effect of entry or merger on R&D. But this literature has not yet yielded strong conclusions, according to Michael Katz and Howard Shelanski, and will not be discussed further here. Katz & Shelanski, supra n. 1 at 23-27.
Both empirical strategies were followed by John Sutton, in his influential study of the 27 relationship between R&D and market structure. Sutton, supra n.15. Sutton argued that market structure should be related to a parameter reflecting the extent to which a firm that outspends its rivals on R&D can thereby raise buyers willingness to pay for its products in comparison with those of its rivals. This "escalation parameter" depends on seller technology, the extent of product differentiation, and buyer tastes. In particular, if the escalation parameter is large, the leading firm in the market will spend heavily on R&D relative to its sales and achieve a larger market share. But if the escalation parameter is small, a range of market structures is possible. Sutton supported his theory first by analyzing statistically a cross-industry data set, and second through an informal narrative analysis of the relationship between R&D and observable features of market structure in selected industries across a number of nations. He cautioned that the value of his cross-country comparisons was limited by the fact that the R&D-intensive industries he studied were "essentially global." Id. at 480.
Eric W. Zitzewitz, Competition and Long-Run Productivity Growth in the U.K. and 28 U.S. Tobacco Industries, 1979 Industries, -1939 
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competition among firms within a nation leads to higher productivity for firms in that country. 29 It is possible that these results mistakenly attribute to differences in competition effects that are actually due to other important differences across nations affecting firm incentives to innovate (differences in national culture or the political power of various industries, perhaps).
This does not seem very likely, however, given that the more innovative industries (and the more competitive ones) are sometimes found in one country and other times found in another.
Moreover, this possibility is inconsistent with empirical studies that document productivity gains (2000).
The competitive incentive to innovate plays out on the ground through the role of 31 entrepreneurs, viewed broadly. Competition requires, breeds, and rewards people that see opportunities and take steps to make their vision happen. Those steps are often fraught with risk, while simultaneously pregnant with the potential for gain. In the hypothetical lemonade stand example, innovation could take place in a range of activities, including the production process (squeezing lemons); product design (raspberry-flavored lemonade); marketing (creating a brand name); distribution (adding more sidewalk locations, or convincing a local coffee shop chain to place the lemonade stand's products on its menu); or finance (extending microcredit borrowing opportunities to ten year olds). The entrepreneurs developing and implementing new ideas could be located within an existing business, where a wide range of employees, including workers as well as managers, may play the entrepreneurial role, or outside an existing business; in the latter case, the risks and rewards are likely greater. Entrepreneurs often must convince coworkers, lenders, customers, and suppliers that risks are worth taking; this is a task that may require salesmanship and coordination. One point of the Toyota production system was to encourage workers to act as entrepreneurs in identifying ways of improving the production process, and one point of business education is to train executives in identifying and implementing entrepreneurial opportunities to innovate. But it is an open question in the economics literature how best to organize the firm internally to provide optimal incentives for entrepreneurial activity, managerial effort and worker effort. See Nickell, supra n.24 at 725-28 (surveying literature on effects of competition on performance of agents within firms). Within the framework of calibrated economic growth models, the adverse effect on 32 productivity that arises when firms can prevent their competitors from using knowledge spillovers to improve production processes and product designs has been recognized by Stephen Parente and Edward Prescott. They conclude that differences in living standards across nations emerge largely as a result of competition-reducing policies within less developed countries, put into place to protect the interests of groups that benefit from current ways of production, that prevent firms from adopting better production methods. Stephen L. Parente & Edward C. Prescott, Barriers to Riches (2000).
If a lemonade stand develops a better way of squeezing lemons, rival lemonade stands 33 might improve upon the new approach, firms in other industries using fresh fruit (producers of frozen juice concentrate, perhaps) might adopt its new process, and firms that produce the equipment used in juice-squeezing might develop modifications to their equipment to make squeezing less costly or more rapid. The lemonade stand itself may, on its own or working with suppliers and customers, see ways of making its process improvement even better. Any of these firms might further recognize that a new lemon-squeezing process makes possible a new and better form of business organization, such as creating a centralized squeezing operation to service all lemonade stands in the area. To the firm, innovation is like solving a puzzle. Before introducing lemonade from freshly-squeezed lemons, a lemonade stand will evaluate the profit potential. It will investigate buyer preferences, gauging how many buyers would find the new product attractive, how much they would likely pay, and the costs and benefits of advertising. It will evaluate production costs, If incentives for preemptive innovation are important, moreover, they might lead a 35 dominant incumbent to innovate more and rival entrants to innovate less (applying the fourth principle).
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the expense of adopting alternative production processes, the likely cost savings from learning or producing at scale, and the costs and benefits of more research and development. It will assess the likely responses of rivals, and it will consider what happens if they innovate and it does not.
Many pieces must fall into place before a new lemonade product appears in the market.
Competition is not a piece of the puzzle; it is the spark that leads a lemonade stand to open the puzzle box and make the effort to solve it. And every innovation puzzle that one firm solves helps it, and other firms, identify and solve others.
Antitrust and Innovation
It might appear that these economics principles do not take antitrust policy beyond the competing perspectives of Schumpeter and Arrow. After all, the second and third economic principles would seem to point in opposite directions with respect to promoting product market competition. Greater product market competition, as would result from antitrust enforcement, would seem to encourage innovation directly, through application of the second principle. But it would simultaneously seem to discourage innovation indirectly, through application of the third principle, as prospective innovators come to worry that they will not fully benefit from their new ideas. This line of thinking would suggest continuing to reserve judgment as to whether 35 antitrust enforcement is good for innovation.
This reasoning misleads because it ignores our ability to focus antitrust intervention on Jonathan B. Baker
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The institutional design problem for policy-makers can be framed in terms of the 36 optimal provision of public goods. On the one hand, information is a public good. Absent property rights, private firms will underinvest in developing and implementing new products and production processes (consistent with the third principle). On the other hand, competition is a public good too. When it is lacking in innovation markets (first principle) or product markets (second principle), private firms will also underinvest in innovation. From this perspective, antitrust rules can the thought of as one way of tailoring the breadth and scope of property rights to assure the optimal mix of the two types of public goods. competition in order to increase the incentives for innovation. But once those intellectual property rights are granted, incentives for further innovation are reduced through the operation of the second principle, as pre-innovation product market competition going forward may be lessened. Initial innovation may be encouraged, but successive (sequential) innovation discouraged. Because much innovation is successive, building on and improving what has gone before, it is possible that broader and longer intellectual property rights can on balance reduce incentives to innovate. Intel defended by denying that the conduct alleged in the complaint diminished the incentives of any firm to develop new innovations of any kind. The settlement prohibited Intel from impeding customer access to technical information for reasons related to an intellectual property dispute or basing microprocessor supply decisions on the existence of such a dispute.
The F.T.C. presumably expected that this settlement would encourage rival innovation to take on Intel in microprocessors without markedly discouraging Intel's own innovation, so that innovation was promoted in the industry as a whole. It is not easy to tell whether that in fact happened. Intel has continued to innovate in microprocessors and Intel's most important rival, AMD, a much smaller firm, has done well recently. But those observations, however suggestive, do not settle the issue. To determine the effects of the settlement on innovation rigorously, it would be necessary to identify the likely evolution of the microprocessor industry absent the settlement, and determine whether AMD and Intel would have innovated as rapidly and in the Jonathan B. Baker
One possible approach would require compulsory process, which the F.T.C. is 41 permitted to employ for this kind of study pursuant to Section 6(b) of the F.T.C. Act. The F.T.C. could review the R&D and marketing plans of Intel, AMD and other industry participants, before and after the complaint and settlement (assuming those old documents are still available), and depose key executives, in order to determine whether Intel and its rivals changed how they thought about innovation.
For examples involving the F. whether the case and the relief obtained are consistent with a reasonable theory of how antitrust enforcement would increase innovation, grounded in economic analysis and industry facts, and then look at the subsequent industry evolution to see whether firms undertook vigorous innovative efforts. The latter approach is most convincing as a way of gauging the effect of 42 antitrust cases on industry innovation when it is possible to identify changes or differences in innovation strategies among firms following the enforcement action, and tie that variation to changing incentives created by the antitrust case. 43 improvements developed by the incumbent firm and new entrants after the settlement. He found that firms innovated in different ways, reflecting differences in their resources and market position, consistent with what would be predicted by economic theory. This research strategy would be more difficult to employ in the Intel example because fewer firms were involved. The remainder of this essay will evaluate the effects of antitrust policy on innovation in still another way: by examining whether antitrust enforcement is targeted at industries and practices that have particular promise for promoting innovation, given the four economic principles set forth above. The focus will be on the kind of industries and practices where enforcement is concentrated, rather than on specific outcomes in individual cases.
Consider first antitrust enforcement in product markets (as opposed to innovation competition or technology licensing). An antitrust policy aimed at fostering innovation would in part target enforcement efforts at types of industries where protecting product market competition is likely to encourage innovation. To begin, antitrust intervention to foster product market competition in so-called "winner-take-most" or "winner-take-all" markets, including many hightech markets, can be expected in general to benefit innovation. When a product or service exhibits network effects (or demand-side scale economies) 45 its value to a buyer rises when some other buyer also purchases it.
Consideration of preemption incentives (the fourth principle) does not change this 46 conclusion, even if the innovation is not drastic (decreasing the strength of the Arrow effect disincentive facing an innovating monopolist). The possibility of pre-innovation preemption by a dominant firm in a winner-take-most industries might make it more difficult for antitrust enforcers to foster innovation by encouraging greater pre-innovation product market competition, but does not detract from the benefits of enhancing product market competition. Similarly, the possibility that a successful innovator in a winner-take-most industry would undertake further innovation in order to preempt rivals might be a reason for antitrust concern about exclusionary conduct limiting innovation in the post-innovation industry, but is again does not detract from the benefits of enhancing product market competition (in order to implement the second principle).
For example, incentives to innovate are likely enhanced by antitrust enforcement in 47 winner-take-most markets against exclusionary conduct by dominant firms lacking a legitimate business justification, such as challenges to sham product improvements that create incompatibilities for rivals without benefitting buyers. Consistent with this approach, courts have found that product design decisions can constitute monopolization if they are not ways of lowering costs or improving product performance. ). Shane Greenstein has described how Microsoft's insistence in 1995 that personal computer manufacturers not alter the "first screen" had "consequences for other firms' innovative behavior by raising distribution costs to application firms," some of which undoubtedly competed with Microsoft, without affecting the incentives for the programmers at Microsoft to design a good product. Greenstein, supra n. 44. Although this aspect of Microsoft's conduct was later found to support a finding of monopolization in the operating system market, the court did not address Greenstein's concern about harm to innovation in applications markets.
Cf. Ilya Segal & Michael Whinston, Antitrust in Innovative Industries (NBER Working 48 Paper No. 11525, August 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=776013 (antitrust enforcement against a range of exclusionary and collusive practices increases aggregate incentives to innovate in a model in which only potential entrants conduct R&D, or else incumbents also conduct R&D with a large prize to successful R&D (such as avoiding displacement by an entrant)).
I do not mean to suggest that an unstructured rule of reason must invariably be applied 49 to decide cases in preference to per se rules or structured (quick look) inquiries under the rule of reason.
An antitrust challenge to exclusionary conduct by a dominant firm is perhaps most 50 naturally brought as a monopolization case under Sherman Act §2. Monopolization requires proof of both monopoly power and a bad act to obtain or maintain that power. The legal 26 outweighed by the improved innovation incentives facing fringe rivals. Fostering product market competition in winner-take-most industries enhances innovation incentives on the whole, by in effect threading the needle between the second and third economic principles set forth above. 48
This is not to say that antitrust complaints charging harms to product market competition in winner-take-all industries are invariably meritorious. In any individual case, it will be important to account for procompetitive business justifications as well as potential anticompetitive harms. The point is simply that we should not worry that antitrust enforcement 49 actions in such industries will systematically chill innovation. To the contrary, such cases are likely to promote innovation. 50 standards for identifying bad acts when the exclusionary conduct does not involve price have been the subject of recent debate. In brief overview, the current dispute is between advocates of two positions. Under one view, a bad act should be identified through a reasonableness or balancing test, perhaps structured as a set of quick look presumptions. . The analysis in the text makes clear that from the perspective of fostering innovation, a reasonableness or balancing standard for identifying bad acts is preferable to any test that deviates from that standard to favor defendants when the monopolization allegation involves a winner-take-most market -the setting where monopolization cases most commonly raise concerns about innovation. To be sure, antitrust courts have arguably adopted a rebuttable presumption that new products or processes do not harm competition so long as they confer some benefits to buyers. Consistent with this view, an innovation is unlikely to constitute a bad act in support of monopolization unless it is a sham, see supra at n.47 (citing cases), and a monopolist's unilateral refusal to licence its intellectual property or sell its patented or copyrighted products carries with it a presumptively valid business justification for harm to consumers. Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9 Cir. 1997 ; th Data Gen. Corp v. Grumman Sys. Support Group, 36 F.3d 1147 (1 Cir. 1994 . Such a st presumption is not inconsistent with a reasonableness standard. It is better understood as a bright line rule (or quick look rule) implementing the reasonableness standard when monopolization allegations involve R&D or innovation, which recognizes the social benefits of innovation and the particular difficulty of assessing the long term benefits and harms of R&D investments and the new products and processes they create.
27
Antitrust enforcement to protect product market competition is also likely to benefit Jonathan B. Baker
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This point is similar to the observation in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines that an 51 entrant's ability to capture a share of reasonably anticipated market growth makes entry more likely, by increasing the "sales opportunities" available to entrants. U.S. Dep't of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 3.3 (1992, revised 1997) .
28 innovation in a second type of industry: one in which the extent of future product market competition is likely to be unaffected by the extent of current product market competition because of probable technological or regulatory developments or rapid growth in demand.
Suppose, for example, that traditional telephone service providers should reasonably expect to face future competition for many of their current services from cable and wireless providers, and possibly wireline competition from the electric company as well. Then antitrust enforcement to protect competition in the provision of telephone services in the current product markets where such future competition is likely would be expected to enhance innovation incentives for telephone companies, relative to a "but-for" world in which there is less competition among telephone service providers but the same anticipated future competition from cable and wireless.
Similarly, the prospect of rapid market growth would tend to make research and development investment attractive, even if rivals are also seeking to capture sales in the same industry. If the market will likely be much larger in the near future, many firms can be expected to invest in R&D, in order to try to capture a share of the anticipated growth. An exception 51 might arise if one firm is thought to have a lead in developing a substantially better product or production process, and if its rivals expect that the leader would be able to obtain a substantial first-mover advantage in the product market (for example, from strong network effects or scale economies). Then rival R&D might be discouraged by the prospect of future competition with Jonathan B. Baker
Similarly, if an initial research and development success confers a large advantage in 52 undertaking further R&D, a first-mover advantage in R&D might operate to discourage rival research and development investments.
Again, the antitrust complaints must be meritorious. In any individual case, it will be 53 important to account for procompetitive business justifications as well as potential anticompetitive harms. It is worth remarking on one conceivable business justification involving innovation for exclusionary conduct that allows a dominant firm to obtain or maintain a product market monopoly. That possibility arises when the firm needs a large scale of production (or substantial cumulative production, to generate low marginal costs through learning-by-doing) in order to make profitable a potential innovation. For example, a lemonade stand owner may wish to conduct research on a new kind of lemon press, but would not find it worthwhile to undertake the R&D unless she could reasonably expect to use it on a large volume of lemons. (Or a telephone firm may wish to develop a new type of switch.) If the only practical way for the firm to obtain the necessary scale is to obtain a dominant position in the product market before investing in R&D, this could provide a justification for conduct that might tend to reduce product market competition (which might or might not outweigh the harm from the loss of product market competition). But this justification should not be accepted if there are reasonable and practical less restrictive alternatives. For example, the innovative lemonade firm may reasonably expect that if its R&D succeeds, it could to obtain the necessary scale through internal growth (and obtain financing from investors impressed with the cost-saving potential of 29 the leader -that is, through the application of the third economic principle. Another exception might arise if an innovation leader would reasonably anticipate obtaining broad intellectual property protection that precludes as a practical matter a rival's ability to invent around its innovation. In this setting, an incumbent may be able to discourage entry through preemptive 52 R&D -that is, through the application of the fourth economic principle. But these exceptions are at most situations in which the third or fourth economic principle might operate to limit the benefits to innovation of efforts to enhance product market competition (and so to qualify the benefits of applying the second economic principle). They might be relevant to deciding where to allocate scarce enforcement resources, but they are not reasons to avoid antitrust enforcement in rapidly growing markets. 53 its new production process). Or it may be practical for the firm to enter into input supply agreements with rival lemonade stands, by which the innovator presses lemons for the industry and sells the resulting raw juice to many lemonade stands. which firms are deterred from innovating by the prospect of post-merger product market competition. (Their example concerns a market in which the third economic principle happens to dominate the second.) Under such circumstances, a merger could enhance incentives to innovate by reducing that competition, but merger review would need to trade off that social benefit against the social cost of reduced post-merger price competition. Katz & Shelanski, supra n.1 at 66-67 (Case 3). More generally, efficiency benefits involving innovation count in favor of proposed mergers if they are merger-specific and problems of proof can be overcome. U.S. Dep't of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4 (1992, revised 1997) ("Other efficiencies, such as those relating to research and development, are potentially substantial but are generally less susceptible to verification and may be the result of anticompetitive output reductions."). Mergers can generate efficiency benefits involving innovation in many ways. For example, they may help speed R&D by allowing firms to share complementary research (e.g. if one firm has a good approach to one step of the process, the other a good approach to another step); speed the introduction of a new product by connecting a firm with promising R&D with a rival that has a strong distribution system; increase the scale of production in order to make production process R&D more profitable; create cost reductions by allowing firms to avoid duplicative R&D; improve coordination among complementary products by facilitating the adoption of a standard interface; or speed R&D by allowing firms to share information about whether certain approaches are dead ends. But merging firms would not be 33 unlikely that firms would refrain from efforts to innovate for fear that later merger enforcement would significantly reduce the value of their new idea. Moreover, the antitrust enforcement agencies routinely consider efficiencies involving both the production of current products and innovation in horizontal merger analysis, limiting the danger that merger enforcement would chill innovation. 62 Jonathan B. Baker
permitted to justify their transaction on the ground that the profits they earn from reducing competition in the product market would enhance their ability to fund R&D. See generally, Katz & Shelanski, supra n.1 at 49-54.
Most federal enforcement resources go into investigation of cartels, unreasonable 63 agreements among rivals, and mergers among rivals. Private enforcement attacks a broader array of possible violations.
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As detailed above, the four economic principles relating competition and innovation suggest where to focus competition policy in order to foster innovation. In particular, an antitrust enforcement program crafted to promote innovation would seek to protect product market competition in "winner-take-most" or "winner-take-all" markets; protect product market competition in markets in which probable technological or regulatory developments or rapid growth in demand largely determine the extent of future product market competition; attack direct reductions in innovation competition; challenge "naked" horizontal agreements to fix prices or allocate customers; prevent agreements among rivals to engage in conduct facilitating coordination with no plausible business justification; and challenge horizontal mergers likely to reduce product market competition.
Measured against this standard, contemporary competition policy holds up well.
These areas account for the great bulk of antitrust enforcement at the federal agencies, as well of much of what goes on in the states and in private suits. There are other areas of antitrust 63 enforcement, including cases challenging vertical restraints, vertical mergers, and restrictions imposed by legitimate horizontal joint ventures in industries not characterized by winner-takemost competition, likely technological or regulatory change or rapid growth. In these remaining areas, antitrust enforcement is on the whole measured. In theory, antitrust intervention in these Jonathan B. Baker
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35 other areas could simultaneously enhance pre-innovation product market competition and reduce post-innovation competition, with the net effect on innovation incentives ambiguous. In practice, however, the great majority of such conduct is likely not to be found to harm competition under current antitrust standards, so these kind of cases in aggregate would present little threat to innovation in the economy even if the incentives at issue in the third and fourth economic principles turned out to be particularly important. Accordingly, it is unlikely that antitrust enforcement to protect product market competition in areas outside those that would be emphasized by a policy focused on innovation would systematically affect the level of postinnovation competition reasonably anticipated by firms conducting research and development throughout the economy.
Conclusion
Antitrust commentators and enforcers need not be defensive about the benefits of competition policy for innovation. Today's antitrust institutions support innovation by targeting types of industries and practices where antitrust enforcement would enhance research and development incentives the most. It is time to move beyond the "on-the-one-hand Schumpeter, on-the-other-hand Arrow" debate, and to embrace antitrust as essential for fostering innovation.
The benefits of antitrust rules and enforcement extend beyond lower prices, greater output and higher product quality; they also include increased innovation.
